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Abstract. Today, e-commerce transactions are typically protected us-
ing SSL/TLS. However, there are risks in such use of SSL/TLS, notably
threats arising from the fact that information is stored in clear at the end
point of the communication link and the lack of user authentication. Al-
though SSL/TLS does offer the latter, it is optional and usually omitted
since users typically do not have the necessary asymmetric key pair. In
this paper, we propose a payment protocol in which user authentication
is provided using GSM ‘subscriber identity authentication’. In the pro-
tocol, a consumer is required to possess a GSM mobile station registered
under a subscriber name corresponding to that on his/her debit/credit
card. The cardholder identity is combined with the GSM subscriber iden-
tity in such a way that without a mobile station, in particular the SIM,
and the corresponding debit/credit card, an unscrupulous user will find
it difficult to make a fraudulent payment at the expense of the legitimate
cardholder. This is achieved in such a way that no management overhead
is imposed on the user.
Key Words: E-commerce transactions security; payment protocol; GSM
security
1 Introduction
In an e-commerce transaction, a consumer typically makes a payment using a
debit/credit card. The communications link between the consumer PC and the
merchant server is usually protected against eavesdropping using Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS). Even so, a number of security
threats remain. One reason for these remaining vulnerabilities is that SSL/TLS
does not obligate client authentication. As a result, it is not easy to verify if
the person who is making a payment is the legitimate cardholder. A malicious
user, who may have obtained card details by some means, may then be able to
use them to make payments over the Internet at the expense of the legitimate
cardholder. Consequently, a way to reduce the risk of such frauds is to perform
user authentication.
Apart from the lack of client authentication, using SSL/TLS to protect an
e-commerce transaction poses another threat. Since SSL/TLS was designed to
secure the communication link, the information is available in clear text at the
destination. As a result, merchant servers have become a target for attackers
who wish to obtain card numbers.
If client authentication is to be provided using public key cryptography (as
supported by SSL/TLS), then the user must first establish a public key pair.
He/she will also need a secure place to store the private part of the key. Usually
the key is stored in the user PC and hence the user has to use the particular
machine every time a payment is to be made. Although a smart card could
be employed to store the key and hence enhance mobility, not many user PCs
are equipped with smart card readers. By contrast, very large numbers of users
across the world now possess a GSM mobile phone.
In this paper we propose a payment protocol in which user authentication is
enhanced using a GSM mobile phone (or in classic authentication model terms,
something the user has). The protocol also indirectly reduces the threat posed
by the storage of unencrypted card numbers in a merchant server by reducing
the value of stolen card numbers to a fraudster. This is achieved by requiring the
user to possess both a debit/credit card and a Mobile Station (MS), i.e. a Mobile
Equipment (ME) and a Subscriber Identification Module (SIM), which must be
registered under the name that appears on the card. In short, the protocol makes
use of MS portability and the GSM authentication mechanism to provide user
authentication in a way that also supports user mobility.
In this paper, GSM subscriber identity authentication is first described, fol-
lowed by the proposed protocol. A threat analysis, and a discussion of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the scheme are subsequently given, followed by
an overview of and comparisons with related work.
2 Subscriber identity authentication
Three main security services are provided by the GSM air interface protocol.
They are subscriber identity confidentiality, subscriber identity authentication,
and data confidentiality. However, subscriber identity authentication is the only
security service used in the proposed protocol and hence will be the only issue
described here. Details of the other security services can be found in [3, 4, 8].
In every SIM, there exists a long-term secret key, Ki, which is unique and
known only to the SIM and Authentication Centre (AuC) of the home network
operator of the subscriber. The home network operator is the organisation with
whom the subscriber has some kind of contractual arrangement for the provision
of service, and which the subscriber pays for this service.
To authenticate a SIM, the visited network needs two parameters, namely a
random number (RAND) and a expected response (XRES). The (RAND, XRES)
pair enables the network to verify the authenticity of the SIM without having
the Ki. To compute the (RAND, XRES) pair, the AuC generates a RAND and
passes it with Ki as parameters to algorithm A3 which is specific to a network
operator. The output of A3 is XRES.
(RAND,Ki)
A3
−→ XRES
The AuC generates the (RAND, XRES) pair as required, and passes them to
whichever network needs them. When a SIM is requested to authenticate itself
to a network, a RAND is sent from the network to the SIM. Since the SIM
is equipped with the function A3 and the secret key Ki, it can generate the
Signed Response (SRES) using RAND and Ki as inputs. The SIM then sends
the SRES to the network where it is compared with the XRES. If they match,
SIM verification is successful.
3 Using GSM authentication for electronic transactions
In this section, an e-commerce user authentication protocol which makes use of
the GSM authentication service is described. In the proposed scheme, a consumer
is required to have a GSM Mobile Equipment and a SIM registered under the
name that appears on the debit/credit card. It is important to note that the
protocol does not need the SIM to be modified in any way. However, the ME
does need to have the means to take a RAND value from a PC, pass it to the
SIM, and pass the SRES value from the SIM back to the PC.
In this section, the system components required are first described, followed
by the transaction processing procedure.
3.1 System components
Three main system components are involved in our payment protocol. These are
a User System, a merchant server, and an AuC.
User System The User System consists of an MS and a PC. The MS (in fact
the SIM) is responsible for outputing the SRES. Therefore, although an ME is
needed to interact with the SIM, the protocol can work without an ME if there is
an alternative means for the SIM to communicate with the user PC. The means
of communication used between the MS and the user PC is not specified in
this paper. However, Infrared, a cable, or Bluetooth1 could be employed for the
purpose (such means of communication are becoming commonplace as mobile
devices are increasingly being used for data transfer). In a recent version of the
SIM Toolkit (U-SIM Application Toolkit) [1], there exists a command called
‘AT command’ which enables a U-SIM to tell an ME to open an infrared or
bluetooth channel. The U-SIM Application Toolkit (USAT), therefore, could be
used to implement the proposed protocol. However, it is worth noting that such
use of USIM Toolkit requires both the SIM and the ME to support USIM Toolkit
commands.
In the remainder of this paper the scheme is described in the context of a
User System in which the PC provides the main platform for conducting user
e-commerce, and the MS simply acts to support user authentication. However,
in environments where the MS has sophisticated user interfaces and processing
1 http://www.bluetooth.com
capabilities, e.g. a WAP or 3G phone, the MS could take on some or all of the
PC’s tasks.
Merchant server and Authentication Centre The merchant server is the
component that interacts with the User System to support electronic transac-
tions. The merchant server also interacts with the AuC in order to retrieve values
required in the user authentication process.
The Authentication Centre (AuC) is required to supply the merchant server
with values necessary for the GSM identity authentication process. It takes in-
puts from the merchant server and produces the values used for identity authen-
tication. The choice of the communication link between the two is again not an
issue here. However, it could be the Internet or a special-purpose link provided
by the mobile network operator.
As discussed in Section 4.2, we suppose that the integrity and confidentiality
of the merchant server/AuC link is protected in some way, e.g. via encryption
and MACs or signatures; however, the means by which this is achieved is outside
the scope of the discussion here.
3.2 Transaction processing
The proposed payment protocol starts after a consumer has decided to make a
payment. The decision about which purchase to make is outside the scope of
this paper — we simply assume that the consumer and the merchant wish to
perform a specified transaction.
The consumer first fills in a typical Internet purchase form using the PC. In
this protocol however, the form is required to contain a field for a mobile phone
number. Upon receipt of the form, the merchant server extracts the mobile num-
ber from the form and the identity authentication process begins. The procedure
is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. GSM-e-commerce identity authentication process.
The merchant server first sends the consumer’s mobile number to the AuC in
order to retrieve three values: a random number (RAND), an expected response
(XRES), and the subscriber name. This corresponds to message 1 in the figure.
Upon receipt of the merchant server request, the AuC generates the (RAND,
XRES) pair using the key Ki of the requested mobile number and algorithm A3.
It then sends the (RAND, XRES) pair along with the name of the subscriber to
the merchant server as shown in message 2 in the figure. Upon receipt of mes-
sage 2, the merchant server first compares the name of the cardholder with the
subscriber name received from the AuC. If they match, the RAND will be sent
to the PC as in message 3 of the figure. Otherwise, the identity authentication
process fails and the protocol ends.
After having received the RAND, the user PC forwards it to the ME. The
ME then sends the RAND value to the SIM, just as it would if the RAND was
sent via the radio interface by a GSM base station. The SIM now generates an
SRES using the received RAND and its stored Ki as inputs to algorithm A3.
The SIM then passes the generated SRES back to the ME, again just as it would
normally (i.e. the SIM is not required to have any special functionality). The ME
then sends the SRES to the PC which again forwards the value to the merchant
server (message 4). At the merchant server, the SRES is compared with the
XRES. If they match, the consumer is deemed to have been authenticated. The
Internet transaction processing may now continue.
4 Threat analysis
In this section, we consider threats to the proposed protocol. The threats can
be divided into three categories: threats to the User System, threats to the two
communications links (user system/merchant server and merchant server/AuC),
and threats in the merchant server and the AuC.
4.1 Threats in the User System
As stated previously, the User System consists of a user PC and an MS. Since
the user PC does not contain sensitive information, the threats arising from the
PC are minimal. Although information that passes via the PC can be cached,
this information is not confidential. A debit/credit card number can be cached
and compromised but the protocol still requires a corresponding SIM to make
an electronic transaction.
Threats to the MS are divided into two scenarios depending on the amount of
information an attacker has. Clearly, if he/she has neither the SIM nor the card
details, a transaction cannot be made and hence there is no threat. It should also
be clear that if the attacker has both a complete set of card details and a stolen
SIM for the cardholder, then the system cannot prevent an attack — unless, of
course, the SIM has been reported stolen and blacklisted by the network. We
therefore consider the two main ‘intermediate’ scenarios.
– Scenario 1: Attacker has a stolen SIM without the corresponding card details.
In this scenario, if an attacker has stolen a SIM and the subscriber name of
the stolen SIM is unknown, although a valid SRES can be generated, he/she
will not be able to create a matched cardholder name necessary to pass the
authentication process.
By contrast, if the subscriber name is known to the attacker, it is possible
for him/her to fabricate a complete set of cardholder details including a
cardholder name corresponding to the subscriber name. However, the fraud
becomes clear soon after the merchant tries to charge the card. In the most
typical case for an e-commerce transaction, the merchant will try to charge
the specified payment card before the goods are dispatched. Hence in such a
case, the threat is small. Nevertheless, the threat can be more serious if the
goods are, for example, information or music which will be delivered instantly
via the Internet. However, even in this case, the threat can be avoided if,
as is often the case, the merchant server seeks payment authorisation before
authorising delivery of the goods. If the card details are fabricated then the
card issuer will, of course, reject the payment.
– Scenario 2: Attacker has stolen card details without the corresponding SIM.
If an attacker has only card details, without the SIM, it will not be possible
to generate a valid SRES. This threat is therefore addressed by the scheme
described above.
Thus, to be successful, an attack on the user system needs both the victim’s
SIM and the corresponding debit/credit card details to complete a fraudulent
transaction.
4.2 Threats to the communications links
If any of the information transferred across either of the links is modified, then
the protocol will fail. Hence, a theoretical denial of service attack exists, although
there are many simpler ways to prevent the completion of a transaction. We now
consider other threats arising to the two links.
Threats on the PC/merchant server link The ‘usual’ confidentiality and
integrity issues apply to the payment information transferred across this link.
However we can assume that, as would typically be the case today, this link is
protected using SSL/TLS. Indeed, the whole purpose of the scheme described
here is to enhance the security provided by SSL/TLS rather than seeking to
design a completely new and comprehensive security system. This is based on the
belief that security for e-commerce must be introduced in ways which minimise
the overheads for all parties, and in particular for the e-consumer.
Note that a possible alternative to the protocol described in this paper would
be to use GSM authentication to enhance the security of the SSL/TLS initiali-
sation process. However, if such an approach is followed, it is not clear how to
achieve the desired link between the GSM subscriber name and the cardholder
name — such an analysis is outside the scope of this paper.
Threats on the merchant server/AuC link Threats on this link can be fur-
ther divided into two types, namely integrity threats and confidentiality threats.
Integrity threats: There are a number of ways in which an attacker could
manipulate this link in order to persuade the merchant server to accept an
impostor. Perhaps the simplest method would involve the attacker using an
arbitrary (valid) SIM and ME in combination with stolen card details (which,
of course, will not match the GSM subscription name). In message 2 the AuC
will provide a valid RAND and XRES for the attacker’s SIM, and will return
the name associated with the attacker’s GSM subscription. An active attacker
could change this name to the name associated with the stolen card details, and
the merchant server will accept message 2. The remainder of the protocol will
complete correctly, and the account for which the details were stolen will be
charged for the transaction.
An alternative attack, again using stolen card details, does not require the
attacker to have a valid SIM at all. The attacker supplies an arbitrary (but valid)
GSM number with the stolen card details. In message 2, the AuC will send a
(RAND, XRES) pair for the arbitrarily chosen GSM subscription, along with the
subscriber name. The active attacker can then replace the contents of message 2
with the name for the stolen card details, along with an arbitrary (RAND,
XRES) pair. The merchant server will accept message 2 because the names
match, and will send the manipulated RAND to the attacker in message 3. The
attacker simply returns the manipulated XRES value in message 4, and again
the attack will succeed. The existence of these attacks means that it is vital that
the integrity of the link between AuC and merchant server is protected.
Confidentiality threats: There are also a number of serious confidentiality
threats. First note that a passive eavesdropper can perform an attack similar to
the second integrity attack described above. Suppose an attacker has a set of
stolen card details and also knows the GSM number for the owner of the stolen
card details. The attacker initiates the protocol using the stolen card details
and the known GSM number. Message 2 will be accepted by the Merchant
server because the GSM number belongs to the valid cardholder. However, if
the attacker can intercept message 2, then the XRES value can be obtained.
The attacker then simply inserts this value into message 4 and the protocol will
complete successfully.
Also note that, in the absence of integrity and confidentiality, the merchant
server/AuC protocol could also be used to find the subscriber name correspond-
ing to any GSM number. This would be a significant breach of GSM subscriber
confidentiality.
These attacks mean that it is also important to provide confidentiality for
this link, and this is why we assume throughout the paper that this link is both
confidentiality and integrity protected.
4.3 Threats in the merchant server and the AuC
Since the merchant server is responsible for the identity authentication process,
in particular the comparison of the names and XRES with SRES, it is important
to protect the server against any attack which might cause the protocol to be
bypassed.
Over and above the integrity of the user authentication process, the mer-
chant server will have access to large volumes of potentially sensitive subscriber
information. As part of the user authentication process, the merchant server re-
trieves from the AuC the account holder name for any GSM telephone number.
Not only is this a sensitive privacy issue, but requiring the AuC to supply such
information may potentially be in breach of its license and/or data privacy leg-
islation. It is therefore vital that the merchant server be protected so that this
information cannot be abused.
One way of mitigating this security issue is to make a slight modification
to the protocol of Section 3.2. In the revised protocol, shown in Figure 2, in
message 1 the merchant server supplies the cardholder name as well as the mobile
number. The AuC is then required to perform the matching between the name
supplied in message 1 with the name it has associated with the GSM number.
If they do not match the protocol should not proceed. If they do match, in
message 2 the AuC simply provides a (RAND, XRES) pair.
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Fig. 2. Revised protocol.
Another way to reduce this threat is for the merchant server to create and
send a RAND to the User System and thence the SIM. Upon the receipt of the
RAND, the SIM generates the SRES and sends it to the merchant server via
the user PC. The merchant server subsequently sends the cardholder’s name,
his/her mobile number, the RAND, and the SRES to the AuC to verify. The
protocol is shown in Figure 3.
These modified protocols have the advantage that the AuC retains control
of sensitive subscriber information. However, they have the disadvantage of re-
quiring additional processing by the AuC.
If the integrity of the AuC could be compromised, then there are possible
attacks to the security of the user authentication process. However, in such an
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Fig. 3. Another revised protocol.
event there are also many other serious attacks to the security of the GSM
network itself, and so we assume that the AuC is well-protected.
5 Advantages and disadvantages
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed protocol are
considered.
5.1 Advantages
The following advantages arise from use of the proposed GSM-based user au-
thentication.
1. The protocol provides user authentication based on GSM subscriber authen-
tication. As a result, stolen credit card details cannot be used to launch a
successful e-commerce transaction.
2. Since stolen credit card details cannot be used to launch a successful e-
commerce transaction, the threat arising from the storage of unencrypted
credit card numbers in merchant servers is accordingly reduced.
3. The protocol supports user mobility. The user authentication process re-
quires only the correct software to be loaded on the PC, and for there to
exist a means to connect the MS to the PC. In the authentication process,
the PC is simply responsible for forwarding messages between the MS and
the merchant server. Moreover, since the protocol does not involve storing
any secrets on the PC, the risks in using untrusted PCs are minimised.
4. From the merchant point of view, the protocol will lessen fraudulent trans-
actions and hence reduce the cost of ‘card not present’ chargebacks.
5.2 Disadvantages
The following disadvantages arise from use of the proposed GSM-based user
authentication.
1. Prior agreement is required between the merchant and the mobile phone
service provider to support the protocol between AuC and merchant server.
To avoid the need for many individual arrangements between merchants
and mobile network operators, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) could be in-
troduced to act as a ‘broker’ between the two parties. This broker could
simply route messages between merchant servers and the AuC. In such a
scenario, merchant servers and mobile network operators would only need
to have a contractual agreement with the broker. One possible candidate for
the broker would be the card brand.
2. Merchants may be charged for the AuC services. This cost therefore has to
be weighed against the cost of ‘card not present’ chargebacks which may
vary from merchant to merchant. Of course, this is not a disadvantage for
the GSM network provider, who may find this a useful additional revenue
stream.
3. If the U-SIM Toolkit is to be used, the proposed protocol may require an
ME and a SIM that support the functionality.
6 Related work
There exist other GSM-based payment systems which we now briefly review.
– The payment scheme proposed by Claessens et al. [2] provides user authen-
tication using GSM. However, unlike the scheme discussed above, it makes
extensive use of SMS messaging.
– The GiSMo (G i(nternet) S M o(pen)) scheme was developed by Millicom
International Cellular in 1999. In this scheme, consumers must first open an
electronic wallet over the Internet and supply their mobile phone number.
Every Internet transaction is then validated with a password sent over the
mobile phone using an SMS message. The GiSMo project, however, ended
in 2001.
– Mint2 and Paybox3 are both GSM-based payment systems. They too require
consumers to first open an e-wallet. Transactions in the two protocols involve
either making or receiving calls using the delegated mobile phone.
– The 3-D Secure Protocol has been developed by Visa [5, 7]. The protocol aims
to provide cardholder authentication for merchants using a central server
called the Access Control Server (ACS). The cardholder must enroll before
using the service. When a transaction is to be made, he/she will be required
to enter a Personal Account Number (PAN) in addition to other information
used in a traditional purchase form. The merchant then requests cardholder
authentication from the ACS. The cardholder is now required to enter a
password or PIN to authenticate him/herself to the ACS. The protocol can
be extended to be used in mobile Internet devices such as a WAP phone [6]
and the transaction flow remains similar to the one specified in [5].
2 http://www.mint.nu
3 http://www.paybox.co.uk
Broadly speaking, the other proposed GSM-based payment systems either
use SMS messaging, require e-consumers to open an e-wallet, or require them to
make or receive phone calls using a GSM phone. The protocol proposed here,
however, does not use any such measures. It simply utilises the GSM subscriber
identity authentication process. The Visa 3-D Secure Protocol is similar to the
proposed protocol in the way that they both aim to provide cardholder authen-
tication. However, the Visa protocol is a complete payment security system, and
is therefore much more complex than the scheme proposed here.
7 Conclusions
Today most e-commerce transactions are protected in a rather ad hoc way us-
ing SSL/TLS — this gives rise to threats, notably because of the lack of user
authentication.
In this paper, we have proposed the use of GSM identity authentication to
enhance e-commerce security. The protocol provides user authentication and
hence significantly reduces threats arising from misuse of misappropriated card
details. It therefore also indirectly reduces the risk of storing card details in
unencrypted form in merchant servers. The protocol works with a ‘standard’
GSM SIM and requires only an appropriate equipped Mobile Equipment and a
user PC. It therefore imposes minimal overheads on the user, thus increasing
the likelihood of successful use. The gains for the merchant in terms of reduced
chargebacks also appear significant, and the possibility of an increased revenue
stream may also make the system attractive to the GSM operators.
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